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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARNOLD FRANCOM dba Day-Nite 
Laundercenter No. 8 
and 
GLEN PALMER dba Day-Nite 
Laundercenter No. 6, Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant. 
I \ Case No. 
9271 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The sole question in this case is whether or not plaintiffs 
render laundry services. 
By statutory amendment, effective July 1, 1959, the Utah 
sales tax was extended to and is no~· imposed upon nthe 
amount paid or charged for laundry and dry cleaning services." 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4(g) (1953). Defendant has assessed 
plaintiffs for sales tax under this section. Plaintiffs contend 
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that they do not render laundry services but merely rent wash-
ing machines and dryers. 
The facts have been stipulated by counsel for plaintiffs 
and defendant respective! y and found to be such by defendant. 
Specifically, in its Decision No. 180 relating to the sales tax 
liability of plaintiff Francom, defendant found as facts (page 1) 
that plaintiff Francom owns the building located at 29 Maple 
Street, Midvale, Utah, known as Day-Nite Laundercenter No.· 
8, in which there are housed about twenty coin-operated wash-
ing machines, about five coin-operated dryers, and other 
facilities hereinafter referred to; that the building is open 
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week; that all facilities 
are available for the use of the general public at any time; and 
that the cost to the customer of using the washing machines 
and dryers is as follows: single load washer, 15c; double load 
washer, 2 5c; dryer, 5c for 5 minutes. 
Defendant further found as facts (pages 1 and 2) that 
all users of the facilities must provide their own transportation 
to and from the laundercenter and transport their own soiled 
laundry to and clean laundry from the laundercenter, locate 
unused washing machines for their own use, load their laundry 
into the machines, set the time for soaking, washing, rinsing, 
and spin-drying, start the machines, add soap and bleach, 
unload the machines, cart or wheel their laundry to the dryers, 
locate an unused dryer, load, start and unload the dryer, cart 
or wheel their laundry to the folding table and fold their 
laundry. 
Defendant further found as facts (page 2) that there 
is no employee or other attendant (including plaintiff Francom) 
4 
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on duty in or around the building at any time or for any purpose, 
except as hereinafter stated. There is a coin-changing machine 
and a soap and bleach vending machine. There is a posted 
direction to call the owner in case of an emergency and a 
special telephone available for that purpose. There are hanging 
on the wall simple forms to fill out in case of a malfunctioning 
washer or dryer. In such a case, the customer fills out both 
halves of a form with a pencil hanging by the forms. One 
half of the form is for the customer's name, address and 
request for a refund of the amount of money lost in the mal-
functioning machine. This half is deposited in the nstore 
mail box,'' and plaintiff Fran com sends the aggrieved cus-
tomer the requested refund. The other half of the form is for 
the number of the malfunctioning washer or dryer and a brief 
description of what happened. This half is hung on the broken 
machine by the customer to warn others against using the 
machine. Plaintiff Francom periodically has all broken machines 
repaired. There is a burglar alarm system. A patrolman makes 
periodic checks of the premises. The lost-and-found department 
is self operating. The customers deposit clothing which has 
been left in the machines on hooks provided for this purpose. 
The owner claims his articles simply by taking them down 
from the hooks. Instructions for the operation of the machines 
are printed on the machines and on wall posters. The premises 
are cleaned periodically during the nighttime either by plaintiff 
Francom or at his direction. Tables are provided for the 
customers' use in folding their clothes. Movable carts are also 
provided for the customers' use in transporting clothes to and 
from the washers and dryers. Chairs and candy and soft drink 
vending machines are provided for the use of customers. 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendant further found (page 3) the foregoing facts 
to be, during the period from July 1, 1959, to and including · 
September 30, 1959, the operative facts of plaintiff Francom's 
laundercenter; and that during the period from July 1, 1959, 
to and including September 30, 1959, the gross receipts from 
plaintiff Francom's laundercenter were as follows: 
Double load washers ____________________ $1, 734.00 
Single load washers ---------------------- 4 71.5 5 
Top load washers -------------------------- 150.30 
Dryers -------------------------------------------- 739.75 
Soap and bleach ---------------------------- 121.15 
Misceilaneous dispense ________________ 3.30 
Total gross receipts ------------------$3,220.05 
Less refunds -------------------------- 20.8 5 
Gross receipts ----------------------------$3,199.20 
Plaintiff Francom filed no sales tax return and paid no sales 
tax on the gross receipts from the laundercenter for the period 
from July 1, 1959, to and including September 30, 1959. · 
Defendant further found as facts (page 3) that on De-
cember 19, 1959, plaintiff Francom received from defendant 
a letter dated Decen1ber 17, 1959, transmitting a report of 
the findings of the Auditing-Sales Division relative to plaintiff 
Francom's sales tax liability for the period from July 1, 1959, 
to and including September 30, 1959, and that said report 
proposed an assessment in the amount of $89.52, computed 
as follows: 
6 
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State sales tax ( 2% of net taxable 
sales of $3,199.20) ----------------------------$63.98 
Local tax ( ~/2 of 1% of net taxable 
sales of $3,199.20) ---------------------------- 16.00 
Total tax due --------------------------------$79.98 
Penalty ( 10~iJ of $79.98) ______________ 8.00 
Interest ( 12% per annum of 
$79.98 for period from October 
30, 1959, to December 28, 
28, 19 59) ------------------------------------ 1. 54 
Total amount due ----------------------$89.5 2 
With respect to the sales tax liability of plaintiff Palmer, 
defendant made identical findings of fact in its Decision No. 
181, em playing the following language: 
"All statements made with respect to the findings 
of fact in the Matter of the Sales Tax Liability of 
Arnold Francom, d/b/a Day-Nite Laundercenter No. 
8, except . . . [statements relating to gross receipts 
and computations of sales tax liability J apply equally 
well with respect to Day-Nite Laundercenter No. 6, 
to the extent that the users of the machines and facili-
ties elect not to engage the services of the attendant, 
as hereinafter referred to, and are incorporated herein 
by reference." (Page 1). (Plaintiff Palmer owns a differ-
ent building, located at 1952 East 2700 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, known as Day-Nite Laundercenter No. 6). 
With respect to the attendant referred to, defendant found 
as facts (page 1) that plaintiff Palmer employs one lady 
attendant who 'vorks at the laundercenter from 10:00 a.m. 
to 6:00 p.m. every day, Monday through Saturday, and that 
plaintiff Palmer's customers may elect to leave their soiled 
laundry with the attendant to be washed, dried, iron, folded 
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and wrapped at the following prices: wash and dry, 55c for 
a single load and $1.10 for a double load; wash only, 35c for 
a single load; dry only, 35c; ironing, $1.00 per hour. 
Defendant further found as facts (page 2) that the 
dual nature of Day-Nite Laundercenter No. 6 is described 
in a posted sign as follows: (tFrom 10 to 6 daily, except Sunday, 
laundry attended-you may leave laundry to be washed, dried, 
ironed, folded and wrapped-or do it yourself-anytime." 
Defendant further found in its Decision No. 181 (page 2) 
that during the period from July 1, 1959, to and including 
September 30, 1959, the gross receipts from Mr. Palmer's 
laundercenter were as follows: 
Double load washers --------------------$1,180.2 5 
Single load washers ______________________ 270.5 5 
Top load washers -------------------------- 102.2 5 
Dryers -------------------------------------------- 513.45 
Soap ------------------------------------------------ 113.40 
Total gross receipts ______________ $2, 179.90 
Less refunds ---------------------- 13.95 
Gross receipts ------------------------$2,165.95 
Defendant further found as facts (page 2) that the report 
of the Auditing-Sales Division proposed an assessment in the 
amount of $60.60, computed as follows: 
State sales tax ( 2% of net 
taxable sales of $2,165.95) ----------------$43.32 
Local tax ( Y2 of 1% of net 
taxable sales of $2,165.95) -------------- 10.83 
Total tax due --------------------------------$54.15 
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Penalty ( 1 O% og $54.15) ____________ 5.41 
Interest ( 12% per annum of 
$54.15 for period from 
October 30, 1959, to 
December 28, 1959) ________________ 1.04 
Total amount due ----------------------$60.60 
Plaintiffs filed timely petitions with defendant for a review 
of the findings of the Auditing-Sales Division. Plaintiff Palmer 
did not dispute his liability for sales tax measured by the re· 
ceipts from the laundry services rendered by his hired attendant. 
Nor did either plaintiff dispute his liability for sales tax 
measured by the receipts from the sale of soap and bleach. 
An informal hearing was held before defendant on Feb-
ruary 10, 1960. It was there agreed that counsel for plaintiffs 
and defendant would prepare a written stipulation of facts 
for submission to defendant, on the basis of which defendant 
would render its formal decision. The facts as stipulated were 
submitted to defendant on March 21, 1960. Thereafter, on 
April 18, 1960, defendant made identical conclusions of law 
in its formal Decisions Nos. 180 and 181, as follows: 
n1. Section 59-15-4(g), Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended, provides that there is to be levied, col-
lected and paid within the state of Utah a tax based 
on the amount paid or charged for laundry or dry 
cleaning services. 
n 2. The activities of petitioner constitute a laundry 
servtce. 
n3. The petitioner is liable to the State Tax Com-
mission for the collection of sales tax on said laundry 
service as computed in Item 9 [Item 7 in DecisioP No. 
181] of the above findings of fact.'' 
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Plaintiffs thereafter, on May 11, 1960, petitioned this 
court for a hearing on their averments that defendant erred 
in concluding as a matter of law that plaintiffs' activities con-
stitute laundry services within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-15-4(g) (1953), and that defendant therefore erred in 
concluding as a matter of law that plaintiffs are liable for the 
collection and payment of sales tax. Plaintiff Palmer concedes 
that his attendant performs laundry services, and references 
hereinbelow to plaintiff Palmer's business mean his non-attend-
ant business only. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The plain meaning of the term lC laundry services" 
is 't acts of laundering;~ and therefore excludes all plaintiffs' 
acts. 
2. The Utah legislature did not intend to extend the sales 
tax to plaintiffs' business. 
3. Plaintiffs do not render laundry servtces within the 
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4 (g) (1953). 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE TERM lCLAUNDRY 
SERVICES" IS lCACTS OF LAUNDERING" AND THERE-
FORE EXCLUDES ALL PLAINTIFFS' ACTS. 
Plaintiffs' receipts derived, as found by defendant, from 
allowing the general public to use coin-operated washing 
10 
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machines and dryers and related facilities owned by plaintiffs. 
These receipts were not amounts npaid or charged for laun-
dry ... services'' so as to be the basis of sales tax under Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-15-4(g) (1953). Plaintiffs rendered no 
laundry services. The terms ((services" and ttlaundry services" 
must be construed according to the ((approved usage of the 
language," pursuant to the mandate of Utah Code Ann. § 
68-3-11 ( 1953), which provides: 
t tW ords and phrases are to be construed according 
to the context and the approved usage of the language; 
but technical words and phrases, and such others as 
have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in 
la\v, or are defined by statute, are to be construed 
according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning 
or definition." 
This rule of stautory construction has been announced and 
variously stated in a number of Utah cases. In Deseret Sav. 
Bank v. Francis, 62 Utah 85, 217 Pac. 1114, 1115 (1923), this 
court, without reference to the statutory rule, announced an 
((ordinary sense" rule of construction in the following lan-
guage: 
tt (T]he presumption is that the words [of a statute] 
are used in their ordinary sense, and if a different in-
terpretation is sought it must rest upon something in 
the character of the legislation or in the context which 
\vill justify a different meaning [citations]." 
In Cache Auto Co. v. Central Garage, 63 Utah 10, 221 Pac. 
862 ( 1923), this court reiterated and employed the ((ordinary 
sense" rule of statutory construction. This court stated that 
the legislative napproved usage" rule and the judicial ((ordinary 
sense" rule are the same, in the following language: 
1 1 
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"~fhe plainest and perhaps the most important rule 
of construction is that unless technical terms are used 
the words employed must be given their usual and 
ordinary meaning. This is not only a general rule 
recognized in every jurisdiction of the country, but is, 
in effect, the rule declared by statute.'' 221 Pac. at 864. 
On still other occasions, this court has declared the same 
rule of statutory construction. In State v. Hendrickson, 67 Utah 
15, 245 Pac. 3 75, 3 78 ( 1926), this court stated: 
"(T)he fundamental rule recognized in every juris-
diction of the country [is] that words and phrases are 
construed according to the context and the approved 
usage of the language. Except in the case of technical 
words and phrases, they must be construed according 
to their plain and ordinary meaning." 
In State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955, 956 (1933), this 
court stated: 
''Under the ordinary canons of construction of 
statutes we are required to give the word its plain, 
natural, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, 
in the absence of any statutory or well-established 
technical meaning, unless it is plain from the statute 
that a different meaning is intended.'' 
The terms "services'' and ('laundry services" are not 
technical words. They have not acquired "a peculiar and appro-
priate meaning in law.'' They are not defined by statute. Neither 
the character of the legislation nor the context justifies a 
meaning different from their ordinary meaning. Therefore, 
under the rule declared by statute and announced by this court, 
the terms must be given their "plain, natural, ordinary and 
commonly understood n1eaning.'' 
12 
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Webster's New International Dictionary ( 2d ed. 1946) 
lists twenty-nine different meanings (not counting sub-mean-
ings) of the noun "service" when used in the singular, and one 
meaning when employed in the plural. In the context of Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-15-4(g) (1953), plaintiffs submit that the 
following meanings alone are appropriate: 
[singular] 
tc2. Performance of labor for the benefit of another, 
or at another's command; attendance of an inferior, 
hired helper, slave, etc. 
* * * 
tc4. The deed of one who serves; labor performed 
for another; duty done or required; office. 
* * * 
[plural] 
"22. Usually in pl. Any result of useful labor which 
does not produce a tangible commodity. In economics, 
such business concerns as railroads, telephone com-
panies, or laundries, and such persons as physicians, 
are regarded as performing services. 
* * * 
(CSyn.- Servitude, employ; ministry, mtntstration, 
attendance; aid, help; favor, kindness." Ibid. (Emphasis 
added except for pl. and services.) 
These definitions show clearly that the rendering of services 
implies attendance or the performance of labor-some activity 
or participation on the part of the person rendering the services. 
This implication was recognized and accepted by this 
court in the instructive case of Creameries of America, Inc. 
13 
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v. Industrial Comm'n, 98 Utah 571, 102 P.2d 300 ( 1940). In 
that case, the question was whether or not one of the defendants 
was entitled to unemployment compensation. This depended 
upon whether or not the defendant performed ((services for 
wages" within the tneaning of the Unemployment Compen-
sation Act. In the course of its opinion, this court stated: 
((The term (services' and (personal service' used in 
defining (wages~ are not specifically defined in the Act. 
In ordinary usage the term (services' has a rather broad 
and general meaning. It includes generally any act 
performed for the benefit of another under some ar-
rangement or agreement whereby such act was to have 
been performed. The general definition of (service' as 
given in Webster's New International Dictionary is 
(performance of labor for the benefit of another'; (Act 
or instance of helping, or benefiting'. The term (per-
sonal service' indicates that the (act' done for the 
benefit of another is done personally by a particular 
individual." 102 P.2d at 304. 
Thus, the term ({services" implies an act, and in ordinary 
usage is broad and general enough to include any act ((per-
formed for the benefit of another under some arrangement." 
Where the word is modified, however, as in the term ((personal 
service," any such act is not included within the meaning of 
the term, but only acts ((done personally by a particular indi-
vidual." Similarly, where the ({services" are ((laundry services," 
there must not only be an act, but an act of a particular kind, 
i.e., a laundry act, or more meaningfully, an act of laundering. 
More commonplace sources than judicial opinions and 
dictionaries may be consulted in determining what the term 
((laundry services" means in ordinary usage. See State v. Na11·aro_. 
14 
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supra, 1n which this court referred to magazines and news-
papers in an effort to determine the ordinary meaning of the 
\\'Ord "n1arijuana." Plaintiffs submit that an excellent indi-
cation of the ordinary meaning of the term c c laundry services'' 
is found in the yellow pages of the Salt Lake City telephone 
directory. Here there is a section headed by "Laundries," and 
another section headed by ccLaundries-Self Service,'' a dicho-
tomy implying that laundries are of two types and ordinarily 
understood to be such, i.e., those in which the acts of laun-
dering are performed for the customer, and those in which 
the acts of laundering are performed by the customer, for 
himself. In other words, a cclaundry" does, but a ccself-service 
laundry" does not, perform laundry services for its customers. 
Often a coin-operated laundry will be of both types, as 
revealed in the yellow page advertisements of the several 
coin-operated laundries, e.g., ccself service or drop off service"; 
ccdrop off or self service"; ccfast drop bundle service or V2 hr. 
coin-operated self service"; and ccself service or drop bundles". 
But whether a laundry is of one or both types, the distinction 
between the types is well, widely and common! y understood, 
as evidenced by the apparent faith of the advertising agencies 
in the communicative efficacy of these abbreviated advertise-
ments. 
The facts as found by defendant are clear. All acts of 
laundering are performed by the customers from the time he 
leaves his home with his soiled laundry until he returns to his 
home with his clean laundry. On the other hand, ccthere is no 
employee or other attendant (including Mr. Francom [and 
~{r. Palmer]) on duty in or around the building at any time 
15 
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or for any purpose,'' except to perform such non-laundry acts 
as refilling the coin-changing and the soap and bleach vending 
machines, answering emergency calls, refunding money, fixing 
the machines, and cleaning the premises. (Decision 180, page 
2). Clearly plaintiffs perform no laundry services, and there-_ 
fore Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4(g) (1953) by its terms is 
inapplicable. 
Plaintiffs' receipts were the consideration paid for the 
use of property and as such constituted rent. Black, Law 
Dictionary (4th Ed. 1951) . Instructive on this point are cases 
arising in New York and Ohio. In each case the question was 
whether the subject business was that of renting machines 
or rendering services, there being a sales tax on rentals but not 
on services. In each case the owner either operated or partici-
pated in the operation of the machines leased to his customers 
(unlike plaintiffs Francom and Palmer), and yet in each 
case it was decided that the operation or participation did 
not change the business from that of renting property to that 
of rendering services. 
In New York City, the sales tax law defines sales to in-
clude rentals as follows: 
ctAny transfer of . . . possession . . . license to use 
... conditional or other\vise, in any manner or by any 
means whatsoever for a consideration, or any agree-
ment therefor." Administrative Code, Sec. N41-l.O, 
subd. 5. 
In Buckley Funeral Home, Inc._. v. City of Neu· York, 
105 N.Y.S.2d 478 ( 1948), a funeral director rented auto-
tnobiles from an automobile rental agency for his customers. 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The rental agency furnished the drivers. Held, the rental 
agency was not furnishing services but was ((selling", i.e., 
renting, within the meaning of the statute. 
In Ohio, the sales tax law defines sales to include rentals 
of tangible personal property as follows: 
cc (A ]11 transactions whereby title or possession, or 
both, of tangible personal property, is or is to be trans-
ferred, or a license to use or consume tangible personal 
property is granted, for a consideration in any manner, 
whether absolutely or conditionally, whether for a 
price or rental ... " Section 5739.01, Revised Code. 
In Randall Park Jockey Club, Inc. v. Peck, 162 Ohio 245, 122 
N.E. 2d 787 ( 1954), a manufacturer delivered possession of 
pari-mutuel machines to a jockey club which conducted_ horse 
racing and pari-mutuel betting. The sole question as stated by the 
court was whether or not there was a lease of pari-mutuel 
equipment or, in relation to such equipment, a service was 
rendered by the manufacturer. The court examined the activi-
ties of the taxpayer with respect to the machines in order to 
determine whether the nature of the transaction was essentially 
that of leasing machines or that of rendering services. The 
manufacturer had from two to ten employees present during 
the operation of the machines to school the jockey club's 
employees iri their use, to service them and afford a con-
stant and continuing operation of the equipment, and to lock 
them after the wagering ended. Held, the manufacturer did 
not render services, but leased the machines. There was an 
indication that had the taxpayer's employees actually operated 
the machines, they would then be rendering services. As it 
was, however, rrthe compensation was made for the use of 
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the machines and constituted a rental payment therefor." 
122 N.E. 2d at 789. (Emphasis added.) 
A fortiori, plaintiffs' business is that of renting coin-
operated washers and dryers. 
II 
THE UTAH LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND TO 
EXTEND THE SALES TAX TO PLAINTIFFS' BUSINESS. 
u (T]he primary rule of construction of statutes is to 
ascertain and declare the intention of the legislature . . .. " 
50 Am. Jur. Statutes § 223 ( 1944). This court has similarly 
declared in Price v. Tuttle, 70 Utah 156, 258 Pac. 1016, 1017 
(1927): 
Uin the construction of statutes it is the duty of 
courts to ascertain the intent of the legislative body 
and . . . to enforce that intent. In determining the 
intent of legislation not only the language of the act 
may be considered, but the purposes or objects sought 
by the Legislature should be and are considered by 
the courts in determining the legislative intent." 
The relationship of general rules of statutory cons~ruction 
(such as the ((plain n1eaning'' rule discussed under I above) 
to this ({primary rule of construction" has been stated as 
follows: 
nin the interpretation of a statute, the intention of 
the legislature is gathered from the provisions enacted 
by the application of sound and well settled canons of 
construction. However, every technical rule as to the 
construction of a statute is subservient and- must yield 
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to the expression of the paramount will of the legis- · 
lature, since all rules for the interpretation of statutes 
of doubtful meaning have for their sole object the 
discovery of the legislative intent . . . " 50 Am. Jur. 
Statutes § 224 ( 1944). 
Inasmuch as the Utah legislature has not indicated in any 
\vay that it intended to employ the term C(laundry services" 
other than in its ordinary sense, it would appear that the dis-
cussion under I above would be conclusive on the question 
of legislative intent. 
It would also appear circumstantially that the Utah 
legislature did not intend to extend the sales tax to plaintiffs' 
business. 
The legislature has categorically declared that ((the vendor 
shall collect the tax from the vendee .... " Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-15-5 ( 1953). C(Vendor" is defined to include every 
person receiving any payment or consideration upon a sale 
of service subject to the sales tax. I bid. If the legislature 
intended to extend the sales tax to plaintiffs' business, then 
it of necessity also intended plaintiffs and others similarly 
situated to collect the tax from their customers. 
How, under the circumstances, are plaintiffs to collect 
the tax from their customers? An employee for such purpose, 
\VOrking less than one-third of the business hours (eight out 
of each twenty-four hours, six instead of seven days a week) 
and for only twenty-five cents an hour, would cost plaintiff 
Francom more than one and one-half times, and plaintiff 
Palmer more than two and one-half times, the amount of 
taxes collected. Obviously the intricate coin-receiving mecha-
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nism of the washers and dryers could be converted to receive 
the penny tax only at great expense. To reduce the rental 
cost of the washers a penny so that no conversion would be 
necessary would be simply to absorb the tax which would be 
contrary to the legislative intent, unfair to plaintiffs and 
others similar! y situated, and would convert the sales tax in 
the case of self -service laundries from a tax on the consumer 
to a gross income tax on the seller. 
Under plaintiffs' circumstances, the practical impossibility 
of passing the tax on to the customer is so evident it is 
unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended to include 
self -service laundries within the scope of the amendment but 
either overlooked this practical impossibility or recognized 
it but failed to make some counteracting or alleviating pro-
vision for it. Therefore only the contrary can be reasonably 
assumed: the Utah legislature did not intend to extend the 
sales tax to plaintiffs' business. 
III 
PLAINTIFFS DO NOT RENDER LAUNDRY SERV-
ICES WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 59-15-4(g) (1953). 
If any doubts and ambiguities as to the meantng · of 
"laundry services" remain after the application of the rules 
discussed in I and II above, they should be resolved in accord-
ance with the rule of strict construction of taxing statutes. 
This rule and its relationship to the two previously dis-
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cussed are explained in 47 Am. Jur. Sales and Use Taxes § 1"1 
( ]l)·l ?>) : 
(CThe usual rules of statutory construction are ap-
plicable to the interpretation of sales tax statutes. Thus, 
the courts, in construing such a statute, must attempt 
to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the 
legislature in adopting it .... [T]he statute should 
receive a reasonable interpretation, and words used 
therein must ordinarily be given their usual and popular 
meaning. On the other hand, since sales tax enactments 
are revenue measures, the general rule that tax statutes 
will be strictly construed and that doubts and ambi-
guities \vill be resolved in favor of the taxpayer and 
against the taxing power is applicable ... " 
This is the law in Utah, as announced on many occa-
Sions by this court. See Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co. v. 
Richards, 52 Utah 1, 172 Pac. 474 ( 1918); W. F. Jensen 
Candy Co. v. State Tax Comm'n1 90 Utah 359, 61 P.2d 629 
( 1936); Norville Z'. State Tax Comm'n, 98 Utah 170, 97 P.2d 
93 7, 940 ( 1940), in which it was stated that the rule of 
strict construction is applicable (Cin case of doubt as to the 
intention of the legislature"; Moss ex rei. State Tax Comm'n 
z·. Board of Con1n/rs1 1 Utah 2d 60, 261 P.2d 961 ( 1953). 
If there are any remaining doubts about the resolution 
of the question raised in this case, it would be hard to imagine 
a situation in which the application of the rule of strict con-
struction could be more appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Regardless of which rule of statutory construction IS 
applied, the result is the same: plaintiffs rendered and render 
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no laundry services within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-15-4(g) (1953). Defendant's decision should be reversed 
and its deficiency assessment expunged. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EARL M. WUNDERLI 
FABIAN AND CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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